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This two-part article discusses the constitutional right to a
speedy trial and the basics of the speedy trial statute.

the cornerstones of the American
he right to
a speedy
trial The
is oneunof
criminal
justice
system.
derlying goals of the speedy trial requirement are justice and fairness. Both the
public and accused are more likely to get
justice if a dispute is resolved in a timely
fashion, with the innocent exonerated
and the guilty punished. Delay can hamper the pursuit ofjustice because memories may fade and evidence may disappear. The requirement of a speedy trial
also acts as a check on government power. People cannot be held in custody indefinitely; the government must provide
the accused with his or her day in court
in a timely fashion.
The right to a speedy trial is a personal and fundamental right. The Sixth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; §
16, Article II, of the Colorado Constitution; Colorado Revised Statutes ("CRS")
§ 18-5-401; and Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure ("C.R.Crim.P") 48 all guarantee criminal defendants a speedy trial. The Colorado statute and rule are
premised on constitutional guarantees
and are intended to render them more
effective. Failure to comply with speedy
trial requirements results in the dismissal of charges.
The purpose of this two-part article is
to review the constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial, and to discuss
the case law interpreting that right. Prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges all
have roles to play in ensuring that the
right to a speedy trial is enforced.
This Part I discusses the constitutional right to a speedy trial and begins the
discussion of the statutory right, cover-

ing the topics of the rule itself and the extension, waiver, and tolling of the statutory right. Part II, to be published in the
August 2002 issue, will address other issues that arise under the speedy trial
statute, including delays caused by appellate proceedings, the interaction between the right to a speedy trial and the
right to the effective assistance of counsel, and delays that are attributable to actions by the prosecution or the court.

The Constitutional Right
To a Speedy Trial
The U.S. and Colorado Constitutions
contain virtually identical speedy trial
provisions. The Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides in relevant
part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial.. . . Section 16, Article

II, of the Colorado Constitution provides
in relevant part: "In criminal prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to ...a
speedy public trial..
. ." Thus, the analy-

sis of speedy trial issues under the U.S.
and Colorado Constitutions is the same.'
A defendant who believes his or her
constitutional right to a speedy trial has
been violated must raise the issue prior
to the commencement of trial.2 Failure
to raise an objection prior to the commencement of trial constitutes a waiver
of the constitutional right to speedy trial.3 It is the defendant's burden to establish that the constitutional right
to a
4
speedy trial has been violated.
The defendant's constitutional speedy
trial right starts to run from the date the
defendant falls into the status of"an ac-
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cused."15 A defendant has been "accused,"

and the constitutional right to a speedy
trial attaches, once the defendant is formally accused by a charging document,
such as a criminal complaint. 6 (As discussed below, the statutory right to a
speedy trial starts to run at the time of arraignment.) The constitutional right to a
speedy trial has no set time period within
which a trial must occur. Accordingly, the
determination of whether a defendant's
constitutional speedy trial right has been
violated
must be made on a case-by-case
7
basis.
The Four Factors in the

Constitutional Analysis
There are four factors, none of which is
dispositive,8 that a trial court should consider in resolving the defendant's motion
to dismiss based on the constitutional right
to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) it and
when, the defendant asserted a demand
for a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay has caused prejudice to the defendant. 9
The Length of the Delay: The U.S.
and Colorado Constitutions do not guarantee a trial immediately on apprehension. 10 Instead, the Constitutions guarantee a trial that is both speedy and consistent with the courtes business.1 No specific
time period resolves the speedy trial question; whether a specific delay violates a
defendant's constitutional rights depends
on the facts of each case. 12
The Reasons for the Delay: Where
the delay is attributable, either in whole
or in part, to the defendant, appellate
courts are more likely to find that the constitutional right to a speedy trial has not
been denied. 13 Conversely, when the delay
is not attributable to the defendant, and
particularly when the delay is attributable to the prosecution, appellate courts are
more likely to find that there has been a
violation of the constitutional right to a
speedy trial.14
The Timeliness of Defendant'sDemand: A defendant who demands a
speedy trial early and often in the course
of the proceedings is much more likely to
gain a sympathetic appellate ear. When
the defendant does not object to a trial
date or seek an earlier date and, instead,
requests an even later date, such actions
have been held to constitute a waiver of
the defendant's constitutional right to a
speedy trial.15
Even a delay in the assertion of the constitutional right to a speedy trial may constitute a waiver of that right. The Colora-

July

do Supreme Court has held that the "de- prosecution to bring a defendant to trial
fendants' delay in asserting their right to within six months of the date the defena speedy trial is entitled to strong eviden- dant enters a plea of not guilty. The initial
tiary weight in determining whether the application of this rule is fairly simple and
defendants were denied their constitution- straightforward. The beginning date is the
al right to a speedy trial."16 The Court also date a defendant enters a plea of not guilty.
has held that a "failure to assert the right The ending date is the date the case is
will make it difficult for a defendant to17 brought to trial. A defendant is "brought
prove that he was denied a speedy trial."
to trial" when the court calls the case, counIn any event, the defendant must raise the sel indicate they are ready to proceed with
issue of speedy trial prior to the commence- trial, and trial commences. For purposes
ment of trial or the objection is waived.18
of the statutory speedy trial right, trial
Prejudice to the Defendant: Preju- commences when jury selection begins,
25
dice will not be presumed when the delay not when the jury is sworn in.
has not been shown to be arbitrary or oppressive 19 nor will prejudice be presumed Assertion
of the
solely from the length of the delay Actual
Statutory
Right
prejudice must be shown by the defenHistorically,it was occasionally quite dif20
dant. What constitutes prejudice deficult to determine whether a defendant
pends on the facts of the particular case.
had waived the statutory right to a speedy
Usually, prejudice arises in the form of
trial or whether the time limit had been
something that hampers the defendant's
ability to present his or her case; for exam- extended by operation of law or actions of
ple, the disappearance ofwitnesses and ev- the parties. Sometimes, it still is. Howevidence and the fading of memories. 21 Prej- er, to reduce the confusion surrounding
udice also may arise from the deprivation this determination, CRS § 18-1-405(5.1)
of liberty, loss of employment and finan- requires defense counsel to expressly obcial resources, personal and family anxi- ject to a trial setting that counsel believes
ety, social obloquy, and the public oppro- is outside of the statutory speedy trial time
brium that often accompanies the exis- frame. If counsel fails to object to the settence22 of charges pending against a per- ting at the time it is offered, the statutory
speedy trial right is automatically extendson.
ed to the date set for trial. This provision
does not apply to defendants who appear
The Statutory Right
pro se. 26 Additionally, a defendant must
move for dismissal based on a violation of
To a Speedy Trial
A defendant also may move to dismiss the statutory right to speedy trial either
charges based on a violation of the statu- prior to the commencement of the trial or
tory right to a speedy trial found in CRS § prior to the entry of a plea of guilty. Fail18-1-405 and C.R.Crim.P 48. The Colora- ure to so move waives the defendant's right
of the statutory right
do appellate courts have consistently con- to claim a violation
2
sidered the statute and rule interchange- to a speedy trial. 1
Although the statute clearly places the
ably.23 While the statute and rule are designed to implement the constitutional burden on the defendant and defense atguarantees, compliance with the statuto- torney to object to a date beyond speedy
ry requirements does not automatically trial, the burden presumably still remains
on the court and prosecution to make sure
satisfy constitutional demands. 24
The statute puts the burden on the court there is a record an appellate court can reand prosecution to bring the defendant to view to determine whether the defendant
trial within six months of the date the de- or defense counsel objected to the proposed29
fendant enters a plea of not guilty. The stat- trial date. 28 In Fisherv. County Court,
ute places on the defendant the burden of the trial date was set with a clerk in the
objecting to a setting that is outside the clerk's office, and not on the record. The
statutory speedy trial limit. A dismissal defendant and defendant's counsel claimed
due to a violation of the statute bars any they voiced an objection to the clerk, but
further prosecution based on acts arising did not go back into the court to place the
out of the same criminal episode. The stat- objection on the record. The Colorado
utory time period may be extended by op- Court ofAppeals held that the burden was
eration of law and may be tolled by vari- on the trial court and the prosecution to
ous actions of the defendant.
make an appropriate record, and that the
As previously stated, the statutory right defendant's motion to dismiss should have
to a speedy trial requires the court and been granted.

116 / The Colorado Lawyer / July 2002 / Vol. 31, No. 7

2002

Extension of the Statutory
Right to a Speedy Trial
The speedy trial statute provides that a
number of events trigger an extension of
the six-month time period within which a
defendant must be brought to trial. Those
events include a request for a continuance
by the defendant, 30 a failure to appear by
the defendant at trial,31 and the defendant's consent to a request for a continuance. 32 The first two of these extensions
are for six months. This means that a defendant's request for a continuance extends
the statutory speedy trial time by six
months from the date of the request; a failure to appear for trial extends the period
for six months from the date on which the
defendant does appear. The length of the
third extension is the length of time between the granting of the prosecution's request for continuance or the waiver by the
defendant and the new date to which the
trial is continued.
CRS § 18-1-405 further provides that
certain periods of time are excluded altogether from the calculation of the statutory right to a speedy trial, with the obvious
net effect of extending the statutory speedy
trial time period. These periods include
certain specified periods of time related to
mental health evaluations and competency; interlocutory appeals, mistrials, and
changes of venue; voluntary absences and
other delays by the defendant; efforts by
the prosecution to secure evidence; and the
time needed for re-setting of trial after
these sorts of delays.
Properly considered, these subsections
of the speedy trial statute "toll" the statute.
In some appellate decisions, the terms "toll"
and "waive" are used interchangeably, but33
the Colorado Supreme Court has noted
that the term "Waive" should apply only to
those events that cause a new six-month
period to begin (for example, a defendant's
request for a continuance), 34 while "toll" applies to those situations that suspend the
running of the speedy trial clock for some
specified period of time (for example, the
period of time that a defendant is incom35
petent).
The Colorado appellate courts have addressed issues relating to the tolling or
waiving of the speedy trial statute. The
next two sections address these cases.

Waiver of the Statutory
Right to a Speedy Trial
It is well settled that a defendant can
waive the statutory right to a speedy trial
and that such a waiver may be either ex-
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press or implied. A failure to demand dismissal on speedy trial grounds, 36 proceeding to trial without a speedy trial objection,37 and a failure to raise a speedy trial
claim until appeal 38 have all been deemed
to amount to a waiver of the statutory right
to a speedy trial.
The statute now contains an explicit provision, mentioned above, that a defendant
must object to a trial setting that is outside
the statutory speedy trial time or the defendant will be deemed to have waived any
statutory speedy trial objection.39 That provision requires not only that defendant's
objection must precede the commencement of trial, but also that the objection
must precede the commencement of any
pretrial motions set for hearing immediately before trial or the entry of a plea of
guilty.
Certain other actions of the defendant
are deemed, by statute or case law,to constitute a waiver of the statutory right to a
speedy trial (thus, starting a new sixmonth period within which to bring the
defendant to trial). One recurring issue is
a failure of the defendant to appear for trial. Historically, if a defendant failed to appear for trial, the speedy trial period was
extended by the length of time the defendant remained at large, plus a reasonable
length of time to get the defendant rescheduled on the court's calendar.4 0 The
speedy trial statute now specifically provides that if a defendant fails to appear for
trial, the speedy trial period begins to run
anew when
the defendant reappears in
41
court.

as when the defendant's whereabouts are
known but his or her presence cannot be
obtained for trial.46
The fact that a defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction outside the state
does not make him or her unavailable for
purposes of speedy trial calculations, unless the prosecution can show that it is unable to obtain the defendant's presence
despite diligent efforts. 47 A defendant in
custody in a foreign jurisdiction does not
forfeit the right to a speedy trial, and the
prosecution still has a duty to make a diligent good-faith effort to bring the defendant to trial. 48 This is particularly true
when the defendant is in the custody of
that foreign jurisdiction and because a Colorado Governor's warrant can authorize
the extradition
of the defendant from that
49

jurisdiction.

The amount of time excluded from the
statutory speedy trial calculation due to
defendant's absence or unavailability is not
limited to the actual time of such absence
or unavailability. The exclusion applies to
50
all delay "resulting from" such absence.
Accordingly, once the defendant is located
or becomes available, the court and prosecution are also permitted an additional
reasonable time to get the trial set on the
court's docket and to prepare the case for
trial.51 What constitutes a "reasonable
time" must be determined on a case-bycase basis, considering such factors as the
difficulty in locating witnesses, problems
with overcrowded dockets, and the goal of
discouraging defendants who run time off
the speedy trial period and then abscond
from the state.52

Similarly, the statute explicitly provides
that, once a trial date has been set, a defendant who requests a continuance
waives speedy trial. On the granting of Tolling of the Statutory
such a request, a new six-month period be- Right to a Speedy Trial
gins to run from the date on which the conIf the prosecution requests a continutinuance was granted.42 If a trial date has ance of the trial and the defendant or denot been set and the defendant requests a fense counsel waive speedy trial in open
continuance, the analysis is different; this court, or if a written waiver of speedy trial
situation is analyzed in the section below is signed by the defendant and filed with
on tolling of the statute.
the court, the period ofspeedy trial is tolled
If the defendant fails to appear for some for the length of time between the granthearing other than trial, the statute ex- ing of the continuance and the new trial
cludes from speedy trial calculations "the date. The statutory right is thus extended
53
period of delay resulting from the volun- by that period of time.
tary absence or unavailability of defenIf a trial date has not been set, and the
dant."" The statute goes on to provide that defendant requests a continuance, the re"a defendant shall be considered unavail- sulting period of delay is attributed to the
able whenever his whereabouts are known defendant and generally operates to exbut his presence for trial cannot be ob- tend the speedy trial period. 54 However,
tained, or he resists being returned to the the Colorado Court of Appeals has held
state for trial."44 In interpreting this pro- that this time period should not be excludvision, the courts have applied it when the ed from the speedy trial calculation unless
defendant simply failed to appear,4" as well the continuance actually affects the trial
The Colorado Lawyer / July 2002 / Vol. 31, No. 7 / 117
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date.55 Thus, in this case, the defendant's
motion to continue the pretrial conference,
before a trial date had even been set, did
not extend the speedy trial limit.

Conclusion
Part I of this two-part article has provided an overview of the constitutional right
to a speedy trial and an introduction to the
statutory right to a speedy trial. The constitutional right-as is frequently the case
with constitutional law-is bounded by
broad statements of principles, while the
statutory right is much more specifically
tailored to the everyday needs of criminal
prosecutors, defenders, and judges. All parties must consider both the statute and
the constitution when evaluating speedy
trial questions. The second part of this article will address a number of issues that
frequently arise in the interpretation of
the statutory right.
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